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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, fifteen years after affixing its signature, the United
States finally ratifiedthe core international human rights treaty, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1
Much to the consternation of the treaty's strongest supporters,
however, the ratification was made subject to five "Reservations,"
five "Understandings," four "Declarations," and a"Proviso."2 These
t Associate Professor of Political Science and Legal Studies and Adjunct
Professor of Law, Wayne State University. J.D., 1987, Harvard Law School;
LL.M., 1992, Columbia Law School; Ph.D., 1996, University of California,
Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Gerald Neuman and Curtis Bradley for
their helpful comments.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
2. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). A qualification
attached to the instrument 'of ratification is a "Reservation," regardless of
designation, wherever it manifests an intent to withhold consent to a treaty
obligation. The terms "Understanding" and "Declaration" have no specified
significance in international law; thus, whether qualifications under these
headings amount to reservations is a question of intent. The "Proviso" was not
attached to the instrument of ratification, and so cannot constitute a reservation.
See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
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qualifications, or "RUDs," have generated considerable
controversy, both within the United States and in the international
community,3 for they collectively suggest an intention to preclude
any obligation to expand upon the substantive rights and
procedural mechanisms already present in the constitutional and
statutory law of the United States. Although a bare obligation not
to backtrack on existing substantive and procedural protections
would not constitute an illusory obligation, reservations that so
limit the obligation would be difficult to reconcile with the object
and purpose of the treaty,4 and would thus call into question the
validity of the ratification.'
Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 571, 602
n.116 (1991).
3. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994); see also Objections to U.S. Reservations by
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden. Reservations, Declarations, Notifications, and Objections Relating
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional
Protocols Thereto, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (1994).
4. "Reservations designed to reject any obligation to rise above existing law
and practice are of dubious propriety: if states generally entered such
reservations, the convention would be futile .... Even friends of the United
States have objected that its reservations are incompatible with that object and
purpose and are therefore invalid." Louis Henkin, Comment, U.S. Ratification
of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
341,343 (1995); butsee Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (defending the
propriety of the RUDs).
5. Under international law, treaty parties may not attach reservations
"incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 3, 1969, art. 19, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan.
27, 1980). Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, it does recognize most provisions of the Convention as
codifications of customary international law binding on the United States. See
Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAIS 417 (3d
ed., West Pub. Co. 1993) (1980).
Doctrine holds that the attachment of incompatible reservations invalidates
the ratification. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.CJ. 15 (May 28). It is
doubtful, however, that the ratification can be invalidated absent a declaration
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Apart from the formal obligation to submit periodic reports to
the Human Rights Committee, it is difficult to identify with
certainty a legal difference that the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR
has made, on either the international or the domestic plane. There
are, however, a number of ICCPR provisions, not subject to any
substantive qualification in the instrument of ratification, that
arguably entail an international legal obligation to extend
protection for individual rights beyond that presently accorded by
federal or state law. Although the "non-self-executing" Declaration
precludes direct judicial implementation of ICCPR obligations,6 the
United States as a corporative entity remains legally responsible on
the international plane for full compliance. The question thus
arises: Does the federal government have full domestic legal
authority, co-extensive with its international legal responsibility, to
take all actions "necessary and proper" to bring the United States
into compliance?
Questions of this type were once thought to have been
definitively disposed of by the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in
by objecting states that they do not regard the treaty as being in force between
themselves and the reserving state. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra, at 687-88. In this case, all of the objecting states have declared the
treaty to be in force between themselves and the United States, notwithstanding
their assertions of the incompatibility of certain U.S. reservations. See Objections
to U.S. Reservations, supra note 3.
Even if the reservations are "objectively" incompatible, it is not clear who
can so judge, and with what legal consequence. The ICCPR supervisory body,
the Human Rights Committee, has asserted, against all orthodoxy, both that it
can authoritatively judge incompatibility and that incompatible ICCPR
reservations are severable, so that the ratification brings into force the very
provisions to which the state party impermissibly sought to reserve. Human
Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), supra note 3, at 5. The United
States Government rejects both of these assertions, and neither has achieved
general acceptance.
6. See 138 CONG. REC., supra note 2, at S4784; but see David Sloss, The
Domestication oflnternationalHumanRights: Non-Self-ExecutingDeclarationsand
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999) (questioning the
conventional wisdom that the Declaration has this effect).
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Missouri v. Holland7 which held that statutes-in that case, the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act-enacted in furtherance of treaty
compliance are within the power conferred on Congress by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.8 This precedent has yet to be applied
to human rights legislation, however, and recent trends in Supreme
Court federalism jurisprudence raise doubts about whether the
Missouri v. Holland doctrine is sufficiently robust to extend federal
authority to rights matters that have been held, in the absence of a
relevant treaty obligation, to fall outside the scope of the authority
conferred upon Congress by the Commerce Clause and by Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
This cloud over the authority of the political branches of the
federal government to implement the ICCPR is darkened by the
fifth Understanding (hereafter, the "Federalism Understanding")
attached to the instrument of ratification, which, in remarkably
obscure terms, anticipates that obligations will be implemented by
"measures appropriate to the Federal system."1" This
Understanding, which has received relatively little attention so far
in the debate over the RUDs, may be a significant barrier to U.S.
7. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
8. Seeid at 432.
9. A different set of concerns about the effect of recent federalism precedents
on scope of the treaty power involves the federal "commandeering" of state
officials. See Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law?
Federalism andthe Treaty Power, 98 COLuM. L.REv. 1726,1755-56 (1998) (stating
that "[a] close reading of Printz [v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)], in
particular, suggests that the treaty power, long thought to be free from
federalism-based restraints, may be subject to some of the same limits that have
been applied to the Commerce Clause. Yet while such limits may follow
naturally from the Court's analysis in Printz, these limits are not consistent with
the broad foreign affairs responsibility of the federal government."); see also
Carlos Manuel VA7zquez, Breard Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1317, 1356 (1999) (noting that "the federalism understanding, alongside the
non-self-executing declaration, appears to commandeer state legislatures to pass
the laws the treaty requires").
10. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 2, at S4784.
11. The most noteworthy exception, discussed in detail below, is Gerald L.
Neuman, The Global Dimension ofRFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33 (1997).
[Vol. 47:891
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implementation of the ICCPR, potentially placing a class of state-
level violations of the international legal obligations of the United
States beyond federal remedy. This result would render the U.S.
ratification of the ICCPR a Pyrrhic victory indeed for the treaty's
advocates.
II. MISSOURI v. HOLLAND, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LIMTS TO
FEDERAL POWER
It is hornbook law that the doctrine of enumerated powers, as
reiterated in the Tenth Amendment, is not an impediment to the
treaty power. According to the Court in Holland:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are
declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States .... It is obvious that there may be matters of
the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed
that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized
government" is not to be found. Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14, 33. What was said in that case with regard to the
powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers
of the nation in cases where the States individually are
incompetent to act.12
The Court thus straightforwardly repudiated the thesis that
See also Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties
are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 328-31 (1999); Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 454-56; Vizquez, supra note 9, at 1354-57; Henkin,
supra note 4, at 345-46; David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1993).
12. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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"what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the
powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do."13 This
repudiation was seemingly reaffirmed in the 1950s by the failure in
Congress of the proposed "Bricker Amendment," which would
have provided, inter alia, that "[a] treaty shall become effective as
internal law in the United States only through legislation which
would be valid in the absence of treaty. " 4
Moreover, the Holland Court did not regard the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, a statute passed in implementation of the treaty, as
presenting a separate issue of Constitutional authority. "If the treaty
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute
under Article 1, S 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.""5 Thus, federal legislative power may
be thought to extend to all matters covered in such international
treaties as the President and the Senate deem fit to conclude,
including matters of individual rights.16
It does not stand to reason, however, that the matter is quite as
simple as that. Holland predated the advent of international human
rights law as we now know it. Treaties in 1920 were more or less
straightforwardly devices for national advantage; an international
treaty obligation was understood to be a component of a quid pro
quo, undertaken in the service of U.S. foreign policy interests as
assessed by those organs of government-the Executiv'e and the
Senate-to which furtherance of those interests was textually
committed. Those federal organs would not ordinarily have been
13. Id. at 432.
14. S.J. Res. 43, cited in Neuman, supra note 11, at 47 n.78. Arguably,
though, the defeat of the Bricker Amendment can be attributed, at least in part,
to assurances that treaties would be limited to matters of special "international
concern," and thus would not unduly intrude upon the prerogatives of the states.
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power andAmerican Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 429-30 (1998); Henkin, supra note 4, at 348-49.
15. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
16. Columbia Law School Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch has captured the
point best in musical comedy: "If migratory birds can have their treaty and fly,
why, oh why, can't I?" (Skit performed at the Annual Dinner of the American
Society of International Law, April 1998).
896 [Vol. 47:891
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expected to undertake treaty obligations for reasons other than a
quid pro quo with foreign powers, let alone for the purpose of
establishing universal standards for internal governance that could
then be imposed on the states. More importantly, Congress would
not ordinarily have been expected to pass implementing legislation
beyondwhat it thought minimally necessary to effectuate the treaty
partners' privileges-the treaty standards having been conceded in
negotiations rather than affirmatively sought. Even though the
Migratory Bird Treaty did, in fact, line up with standards that the
federal government had previously sought to impose on the states,
only to run afoul of the doctrine of enumerated powers,17 the
Holland Court, given the typical nature of treaties at that time,
would have been less likely than today's Court to perceive a federal
motive to exploit the treaty power at the expense of the
prerogatives of the states.18
In the last few years, the Court has powerfully reasserted
constitutional limitations on Congressional power to legislate in
areas traditionally left to the competence of the states. In striking
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City of
17. "An earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance
of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States had been
held bad in the District Court. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. Rep. 154.
United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. Rep. 288." Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
18. For a more elaborate rendition of this point, see Bradley, supra note 14,
at 459-60; Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part 1, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 98, 121-24 (2000). David M. Golove has, however, put a significant dent
in this conventional wisdom, pointing out that the decision in Holland came
amid a national debate, cited in the briefs, over the prospect that treaties
sponsored by the newly-formed International Labor Organization would intrude
on the states' jurisdiction over labor regulation in ways that federal legislation,
under then-prevalent constitutional precedents, could not. SeeDavid M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1267-69 (1999); but see
Bradley, supra, 99 MICH. L. REV. at 132 n.210 (answering Golove's point by
noting, inter alia, that "U.S. treatymakers perceived federalism limits on their
ability to enter into labor treaties after Holland"). One gets the sense that the
dust has not yet settled on the debate over the Holland Court's expectations.
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Boerne v. Flores1 ' and provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison,0 the Court has made
clear its judgment that, notwithstanding the developments of the
Civil Rights era,21 neither the Section Five Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Commerce Clause can be read
to confer on Congress plenary legislative power over rights matters.
In City of Boerne, where Congress had sought to expand rights of
religious exercise beyond the Court's current interpretation of Free
Exercise Clause guarantees, the Court held that the Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment conferred on Congress only a remedial
power to address state violations of the rights contained in Section
1 (rights subject to the Court's authoritative interpretation), not a
substantive power to create new rights.' In Morrison, where
19. 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
20. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
21. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding
the Voting Rights Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
measure in remediation of patterns of state violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding Section 5 to be "a
positive grant of legislative power" that includes authority to prohibit state
conduct that is not itself unconstitutional); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (indicating in two separate opinions, by six justices, that Congress may
legislate against interference with Fourteenth Amendment rights, even by non-
state actors); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause's conferral of
power to regulate "moral and social wrongs" that have a "substantial effect" on
interstate commerce).
22. The Court thus resolved doubts about the continued vitality of a series
of "Redemption"-era decisions that had struck down, as exceeding the
authorization of Section 1, federal legislation addressing the discriminatory
practices of non-state actors. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
554 (1876). The Court pointed out that an early draft of Section 5 had contained
a more substantive authorization:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1034 (1866)). This version was withdrawn after objections that it would confer
898 [Vol. 47:891
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Congress had sought to regulate gender-motivated violence by
private persons, the Court reiterated the limitation of
Congressional power under Section 5 to the remediation of
constitutional violations by state actors, and further denied
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
private activities that are non-economic in nature, irrespective of
the purported "substantial effects" of those activities on interstate
commerce.
23
It is hard to believe that the Court's reaffirmation of limitations
on Congressional power to legislate in areas of individual
rights-either against non-state actors outside the realm of
commerce, or against the states themselves beyond the scope of
Supreme Court interpretations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-can lightly be trumped by invocation of Missouri 'v.
Holland. At minimum, the Court would likely disallow any
transparent effort to use the treaty power as an "end run" around
those limitations. A treaty of convenience designed to impose
federal values on recalcitrant states-for example, a treaty hastily
concluded with a single foreign government on the prohibition of
the execution of any persons under the age of eighteen at the time
of the commission of their crimes-would almost certainly occasion
a judicial qualification of the sweeping dictum articulated in
Holland. The same can be said of implementing legislation that
manifestly exceeds the requirements of compliance with a bonafide
human rights treaty standard-for example, legislation barring the
states from executing persons under eighteen, based on a
tendentious Congressional interpretation of treaty language
prohibiting "deprivation of life without due process of law."
The real question is not whether the Missouri v. Holland
doctrine provides blanket validation of treaty-based federal rights
measures, but rather, under what circumstances a Congressional
interpretation of human rights treaty obligations can serve to
extend federal authority over matters otherwise reserved to the
too much power on Congress. See id.
23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
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states. Even if unambiguous obligations under a bonafide human
rights treaty can be implemented under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, treaty obligations are seldom completely unambiguous, and
are often subject to wide-ranging interpretation. The international
legal system conspicuously lacks mechanisms for treaty
interpretations that bind the states parties generally,24 and
international evaluation of state party performance in particular
cases requires state party consent to adjudication, which the United
States most often withholds.' This lack of authoritative
interpretation at the international level raises the question of
whether Congress should be given broad latitude to determine the
scope of the obligation it purports to implement, or whether the
Court, in reconciling federal foreign policy interests with the
prerogatives of the states, should substantively review the
reasonableness of the Congressional implementation, perhaps even
holding Congress to the narrowest possible interpretation of the
international obligations so as to guard against exorbitant
impositions of Congressional power upon the states.
Although no case testing the limits of the Missouri v. Holland
24. Even the International Court of Justice (ICJ) technically lacks authority
to issue binding treaty interpretations, except as addressed to the state parties
before it in a particular controversy. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (1945), Art. 59. The Human Rights Committee
established under the ICCPR has no power of binding interpretation
whatsoever.
25. For example, the United States has withdrawn its consent from the
general-purpose ("compulsory") jurisdiction of the ICJ (in the wake of an adverse
ICJ judgment in the case brought by Nicaragua over the "contra" war in the
1980s), has reserved to the provisions of the Genocide, Torture, and Racial
Discrimination Conventions that provide for ICJ adjudication, and has not
consented to the individual complaint mechanism of the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 344-45. Interestingly, the United States
is subject to ICJ adjudications in cases involving the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, resulting in an adverse judgment involving Arizona's
execution of German nationals who had not been given appropriate access to the
German consulate at the time of their arrest. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), also available at
< http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm >.
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doctrine has yet arisen, Gerald L. Neuman's 1997 law review article
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
illustrates the doctrine's potential significance for human rights. 26
RFRA would have prohibited the state and federal governments
from "substantially burdening" the exercise of religion, even by
facially neutral laws, unless the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."27
Neuman notes that the Act, struck down in City of Boerne as
exceeding Congressional power, could plausibly be rearticulated as
an implementation of Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, which provides
that "[flreedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as ... are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others."28 Although acknowledging that the fit is not
a perfect one, Neuman argues that Congress should have leeway to
use its judgment in crafting implementing legislation.
The compelling interest test of RFRA appears to be more
demanding than the standard for "necessary" limitations
under Article 18. RFRA's category of substantial burdens
on the exercise of religion might be broader than the
category of limitations on the right to manifest one's
religion in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.
Nonetheless, just as Congress found in RFRA that the
compelling interest test was a traditional and workable
standard for resolving conflicts between the exercise of
religion and other government interests, so Congress could
26. See Neuman, supra note 11.
27. 42 U.S.C. S 2000bb-1 (2001), construed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (determining that the stated purpose of the legislation
was to effectively overrule the Supreme Court's curtailment, in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), of the scope of Free Exercise Clause rights
previously announced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, Art.
18(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178.
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reasonably find that the traditional categories of religious
exercise and compelling interest provided an appropriate
mechanism for protecting the manifestation of religious
beliefs in practice within the legal system of the United
States. 9
Neuman concludes that Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, in conjunction
with the Missouri v. Holland doctrine, could have provided an
independent basis for the legislation."
Neuman's reasoning is enticing to the international lawyer. If
accepted by the courts, his thesis would demonstrate a domestic
legal significance to U.S. acceptance of "non-self-executing" human
rights. obligations. Yet even if he is correct that the Missouri v.
Holland doctrine opens the way for the expansion of federally-
guaranteed rights, there is still the ICCPR Federalism
Understanding to consider. Although Neuman argues that the
Understanding "does not decrease the United States' international
obligations and does not decrease in the slightest the power of
Congress to implement those obligations," 31 there is reason to
question the latter conclusion.
IT[. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ICCPR FEDERALISM
UNDERSTANDING
The fifth Understanding attached to the U.S. instrument of
ratification reads as follows:
29. Neuman, supra note 11, at 50 (footnote omitted).
30. Gerald L. Neuman initially argued that the Missouri v. Holland rationale
"would support a verbatim re-enactment of the statute if Congress so chose."
Neuman, supra note 11, at 53. He subsequently reports having "been reasonably
admonished, however, that now that the Supreme Court has decided Cit of
Boerne, and given the particular reasons on which the Supreme Court relied for
invalidating RFRA, a new statute substantively identical to RFRA could not be
based on the treaty power without encountering a high risk of invalidation as a
subterfuge." Neuman, Lectur" The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1645 n.101 (1999).
31. Neuman, supra note 11, at 52.
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That the United States understands that this Covenant
shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the
extent that it exercises legislative andjudicialjurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and
local governments; to the extent that state and local
governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of
the state or local governments may take appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.32
Neuman treats this language dismissively: "The content of the
understanding is wholly circular-measures appropriate to the
Federal system' include, when Congress deems it necessary, federal
legislation ensuring that state and local governments comply with
the international obligations of the United States."" Louis Henkin
has similarly stated that the Understanding "serve[s] no legal
purpose."34 Yet the Understanding, though so convoluted as
virtually to belie that designation, cannot so easily be regarded as
surplusage.
Those who have commented on the Understanding have
focused on the fact that the Executive and the Senate did not intend
it to have the legal effect of a reservation." That is to say, the
Understanding does not seek to limit the legal responsibility of the
32. 138 CoNG. REc., supra note 2, at S4784 (emphasis added).
33. Neuman, supra note 11, at 52.
34. Henkin, supra note 4, at 346. Henkin articulated that view prior to the
City ofBoerne and Morrison decisions, however, and in the course of an overall
analysis at odds with the spirit of those decisions: "There are no significant
'states' rights' limitations on the treaty power. There is little that is not 'within
the jurisdiction of the United States,' i.e., within the treaty power, or within the
legislative power of Congress under the Commerce Power, under its authority
to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, or under its power to do what is
necessary and proper to carry out its treaty obligations." IdZ at 345 (footnote
omitted).
35. See Paust, supra note 11, at 328-31; Henkin, supra note 4, at 34546;
Stewart, supra note 11, at 1202.
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United States, on the international plane, to see to it that, by
whatever means of implementation, all aspects of the treaty's
obligations (other than those subject to an express reservation) are
fulfilled.36
But the effect of the Understanding in domestic law is a wholly
separate question. Defaulting on treaty obligations is not
unthinkable from the standpoint of domestic law; the United States
has the sovereign power to violate the treaty and take whatever
legal consequences may follow on the international plane. 7 If the
Senate's consent to ratification manifests an intent that domestic
implementation proceed only in certain ways or not at all, it is
hardly clear why this condition-which may have been integral to
the consent to ratification-should not be given effect in domestic
law.38
According to David P. Stewart, who while serving as a State
Department Assistant Legal Adviser helped to secure the Senate's
consent, "[t]he understanding serves to emphasize domestically that
there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority
between the state and local governments or to use the provisions of
36. Had the Federalism Understanding been intended as an interpretation
of the limits of the treaty obligation, and thus as a conditional reservation (i.e.,
we understand our treaty obligation to extend only so far, and insofar as it is
held to extend farther, we reserve), it would have been in tension with the
principle that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for failure to perform a treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 5, at 690. It is an open question whether such a conditional
reservation could be reconciled with the object and purpose of the treaty.
37. A familiar manifestation of this sovereign power is the "later-in-time"
rule, which holds that, in the domestic law of the United States, treaties are
overridden by directly inconsistent subsequent statutes, which constitute "the
latest expression of sovereign will." See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States andIts
Treaties: Obligation and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 313-21 (2001).
38. The so-called "Helms Proviso," highlighting the constitutional truism
that "Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States," 138 CoNG. REC., supra note
2, at S4784, is directed precisely to the point that treaty compliance is not a
categorical imperative.
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the Covenant to 'federalize' matters now within the competence of
the states."39 It is unclear how much thought the Executive and the
Senate gave to the implications of this statement of "non-intent." It
has been suggested that the main function of the language is to
negate any implication of federal preemption, thereby to invite
state and local implementation,' but this interpretation seems far-
fetched, since the ICCPR provisions at issue pertain precisely to
those exercises of the police power that are least likely to be
federally, preempted.4 The far more natural interpretation is that
the Understanding was intended as a Bricker Amendment in
miniature: ratification of the ICCPR was not to have any Missouri
v. Holland effect of extending federal competence to matters not
otherwise within the scope of Congressional power.
The first part of the first clause states that the treaty "shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein."42 The necessary implication is that there are
matters over which the federal government does not currently
possess or does not currently exercise jurisdiction, and as to which
39. Stewart, supra note 11, at 1202.
40. Jordan J. Paust argues as follows:
The federal clauses delegate and guarantee a competence of state and
local authorities to act affirmatively to implement human rights and to
have those choices protected as long as they are otherwise in fulfillment
of the treaties. Thus, the federal clauses provide state and local
competencies to participate in treaty effectuation in ways that might
otherwise have been suspect under more inhibiting notions of federal
preemption. The new implementary freedom guaranteed under the
treaty regimes encourages participation and provides an opportunity for
states and sub-state entities to choose affirmative approaches to human
rights implementation.
Paust, supra note 11, at 330-31 (footnote omitted).
41. It is, however, worth noting the ingenious argument of Thomas
Buergenthal that the Federalism Understanding actually invites state courts to
implement the ICCPR as they deem "appropriate," thereby partly circumventing
the "non-self-executing" Declaration. Thomas Buergenthal, Modem Constitutions
and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211,222 (1997).
42. 138 CONG. REc., supra note 2, at S4784.
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this first clause, at least, excludes the promise of federal
implementation. The second part of the first clause-"and otherwise
by the state and local govemments"'43-reinforces the idea that
matters not already within federal jurisdiction are not hereby, at
least so far, placed within federal jurisdiction.
The second clause begins with a delimitation of its subject
matter-"to the extent that state and local governments exercise
jurisdiction over such matters --and ends with a statement of its
objective-"to the end that the competent authorities of the state or
local governments may take appropriate measures for the
fulfillment of the Covenant."4' In other words, matters that begin
within the competence of state and local governments are intended
to remain within the competence of state and local governments,
with no suggestion of "measures" of direct implementation being
taken at any other level. The intermediate words that unite the
beginning and the end of the second clause-"the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system"46 -do not change the agents of ultimate implementation
("the competent authorities of the state or local governments 47).
Rather, they suggest federal measures to spur those agents to action,
measures themselves subject to a limitation of "appropriateness."
The natural referent of "appropriateness" is the deference due state
and local authorities in a federal system within which, in
accordance with the terms of the first clause, the pre-treaty balance
of competencies remains unchanged.
Perhaps there is a contrary way to read the Understanding, but
it is hard to see how such a reading could avoid reducing crucial
terms to sheer meaninglessness. If "measures appropriate to the
Federal system "" amount to plenary power, and if measures "to the
end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments
43. Id
44. Id
45. Id
46. id
47. Id
48. Id
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may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Covenant"49 include direct implementation measures that
circumvent state and local authority, there is little way to account
for the existence of any of this language. The Understanding is thus
best interpreted as intended to disable the ratification from
enhancing federal power at the expense of the states, thereby to
overcome some of the qualms that for fifteen years denied the
treaty the needed margin in the Senate.
One can argue that even if this was the intent, it is not legally
controlling. There has been controversy among academics, in
connection with the "non-self-executing" Declaration, as to whether
qualifications other than reservations, attached to the instrument of
ratification, are actually dispositive of the domestic legal effects of
the ratification. Under the terms of the Constitution, it is the
treaties themselves that have the status of federal law, and the
qualifying declarations of various designations are merely an
innovation of Senate practice."
Courts, though, have typically held, at minimum, that while
such a "declaration may not carry controlling weight on this issue,
the Senate's view is entitled to substantial deference given the role
the United States Constitution confides in the Senate with regard
to the process of making treaties the law of the United States. ""l
There seems little reason why the Senate, which is empowered to
block treaty ratification altogether orto limit the international legal
49. Ia
50. See John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1303-04 (1993)
("Additional statements are not part of the treaty and thus are not 'law' under
the Supremacy Clause"); Reisenfeld &Abbott, supra note 2, at 609 (although "[i]t
may well be that U.S. courts in the process of interpreting treaties should give
great weight to Executive/Senate statements of intent in their making.... great
weight does not demand blind obedience"); Charles H. Dearborn I, Note, The
Domestic Legal Effect ofDeclarations that Treaty Provisions are Not Self.Executing,
57 TEX. L. REV. 233, 248 (1979) (It would be inappropriate... for a court to
consider aSenate declaration as evidence of intent because courts have established
that the crucial intent is that of all the contracting parties.").
51. White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
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consequences of ratification through the attachment of reservations,
should not be able to limit domestic legal consequences through
"understandings," "declarations," and "provisos." 2 If anything, the
case for deference to the Federalism Understanding is stronger than
that for deference to the "non-self-executing" Declaration, since the
latter arguably intrudes upon the integrity of a separate branch of
government, the judiciary, whereas the former merely disavows
any effort to appropriate power to the branches that have made the
treaty. And since treaty ratification requires the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate, the conditions that secured this super-majority
may properly hold in check the subsequent implementation efforts
of a Congressional majority.
In sum, the ICCPR Federalism Understanding seems fatal to
any Congressional effort to employ the ICCPR, in conjunction
with the Missouri v. Holland doctrine, to extend federal power over
rights questions beyond the limitations specified in the Supreme
Court's holdings in City ofBoerne v. Flores3 and in United States v.
Morrison.54 A Court that issued those latter holdings will have no
difficulty in deciding that the Understanding blocks any treaty-
based strategy to circumvent them."5
52. See Buergenthal, supra note 41, at 222 (questioning the constitutionality
of the declaration, but conceding its otherwise controlling nature by stating that
"in the absence of the above declaration, most provisions of the Covenant would
be considered to be self-executing under U.S. law"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 303 cmt. d (1987) ("The
Senate may also give its consent on conditions that do not require change in the
treaty but relate to its domestic application, e.g., that the treaty shall not be self-
executing .... ."); Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The
Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1176-77 (1956) (opining that
qualifications other than reservations, attached by the Senate as conditions of
ratification, can be valid as domestic law).
53. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
54. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
55. Gerald Neuman suggests that a 1996 statute outlawing female genital
mutilation, 18 U.S.C. S 116 (2001), may provide a test case. In enacting the
statute, Congress specifically invoked the treaty clause, along with other
rationales now seemingly moribund in the wake of Morrison. Congressional
Findings, Pub. L. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996), Div. C, Title VI, Subtitle D, § 645(a),
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although it is an often-repeated slogan that "international law
is part of our law,"56 the United States has largely resisted the
incorporation of international law into the domestic legal order,
just as it has largely resisted adopting international human rights
obligations that might lead to calls for modification of U.S.
institutions and practices. The RUDs attached to the 1992
ratification of the ICCPR both reflect and effectuate that resistance.
Collectively, they all but nullify the legal effect of the ratification
on both the international and the domestic planes. As Louis
Henkin has noted with sadness, "By its package of RUDs, the
United States effectively fulfilled Senator Bricker's purpose, leaving
the Covenant without any life in United States law .... ""
Gerald Neuman's RFRA proposal, in suggesting that the
ICCPR ratification may extend federal power to legislate rights
beyond otherwise-applicable constitutional limitations, 8 holds out
the hope of a residual effect for the ratification in domestic law. A
close reading of the Federalism Understanding, however, exposes
that hope as quite probably forlorn, just as the spirit animating the
RUDs as a whole would lead one to anticipate. At the heart of the
RUDs is the conviction that international human rights law should
not be allowed to modify any aspect of U.S. constitutionalism, and
that includes, unsurprisingly, the federal-state balance.
Whether the RUDs represent due regard for time-tested and
authentically American institutions and practices, or merely the
arrogance of a superpower that exempts itself from the
accommodation of international sensibilities that it demands of
other states, will long be debated. Either way, examination of the
RUDs might well cause one to reflect on the possibility that the
110 Stat. 3009-708.
56. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
57. Henkin, supra note 4, at 349.
58. Neuman, supra note 11, at 51-53.
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foreigners whom we routinely criticize for human rights
shortcomings are no more doggedly attached to their institutions
and practices than we are to our own.
